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Moderation.” Recessions have become less fre-
quent and milder, and quarter-to-quarter volatility
in output and employment has declined signifi-
cantly as well. The sources of the Great Moderation
remain somewhat controversial, but, as I have
argued elsewhere, there is evidence for the view
that improved control of inflation has contributed
in important measure to this welcome change in
the economy (Bernanke, 2004). Paul Volcker and
his colleagues on the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee deserve enormous credit both for recogniz-
ing the crucial importance of achieving low and
stable inflation and for the courage and persever-
ance with which they tackled America’s critical
inflation problem.
I could say much more about Volcker’s
achievement and its lasting benefits, but I am sure
that many other speakers will cover that ground.
Instead, in my remaining time, I will focus on
some lessons that economists have drawn from
the Volcker regime regarding the importance of
credibility in central banking and how that credi-
bility can be obtained. As usual, the views I will
express are my own and are not necessarily shared
by my colleagues in the Federal Reserve System.
Volcker could not have accomplished what
he did, of course, had he not been appointed to
the chairmanship by President Jimmy Carter. In
retrospect, however, Carter’s appointment decision
seems at least a bit incongruous. Why would the
President appoint as head of the central bank an
individual whose economic views and policy
goals (not to mention personal style) seemed, at
least on the surface, quite different from his own?
However, not long into Volcker’s term, a staff
economist at the Board of Governors produced a
paper that explained why Carter’s decision may in




he question asked of this panel is,
“What have we learned since October
1979?” The evidence suggests that we
have learned quite a bit. Most notably,
monetary policymakers, political leaders, and
the public have been persuaded by two decades
of experience that low and stable inflation has
very substantial economic benefits. 
This consensus marks a considerable change
from the views held by many economists at the
time that Paul Volcker became Fed Chairman. In
1979, most economists would have agreed that,
in principle, low inflation promotes economic
growth and efficiency in the long run. However,
many also believed that, in the range of inflation
rates typically experienced by industrial countries,
the benefits of low inflation are probably small—
particularly when set against the short-run costs
of a major disinflation, as the United States faced
at that time. Indeed, some economists would have
held that low-inflation policies would likely prove
counterproductive, even in the long run, if an
increased focus on inflation inhibited monetary
policymakers from responding adequately to fluc-
tuations in economic activity and employment. 
As it turned out, the low-inflation era of the
past two decades has seen not only significant
improvements in economic growth and produc-
tivity but also a marked reduction in economic
volatility, both in the United States and abroad,
a phenomenon that has been dubbed “the Great
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and indeed the society’s, point of view. Although
the question seems a narrow one, the insights of
the paper had far broader application; indeed, this
research has substantially advanced our under-
standing of the links among central bank credibil-
ity, central bank structure, and the effectiveness
of monetary policy.
Insiders will have already guessed that the
Board economist to whom I refer is Kenneth
Rogoff, currently a professor of economics at
Harvard, and that the paper in question is Ken’s
1985 article, “The Optimal Degree of Commitment
to an Intermediate Monetary Target” (Rogoff,
1985).1 The insights of the Rogoff paper are well
worth recalling today. Rather than considering the
paper in isolation, however, I will place it in the
context of two other classic papers on credibility
and central bank design, an earlier work by Finn
Kydland and Edward Prescott and a later piece by
Carl Walsh. As I proceed, I will note what I see to
be the important lessons and the practical impli-
cations of this line of research.2
Central bankers have long recognized at some
level that the credibility of their pronouncements
matters. I think it is fair to say, however, that in the
late 1960s and 1970s, as the U.S. inflation crisis
was building, economists and policymakers did
not fully understand or appreciate the determi-
nants of credibility and its link to policy outcomes.
In 1977, however, Finn Kydland and Edward
Prescott published a classic paper, entitled “Rules
Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of
Optimal Plans” (Kydland and Prescott, 1977), that
provided the first modern analysis of these issues.3
Specifically, Kydland and Prescott demonstrated
why, in many situations, economic outcomes will
be better if policymakers are able to make credible
commitments, or promises, about certain aspects
of the policies they will follow in the future.
“Credible” in this context means that the public
believes that the policymakers will keep their
promises, even if they face incentives to renege.
In particular, as one of Kydland and
Prescott’s examples illustrates, monetary policy-
makers will generally find it advantageous to
commit publicly to following policies that will
produce low inflation. If the policymakers’ state-
ments are believed (that is, if they are credible),
then the public will expect inflation to be low and
demands for wage and price increases should
accordingly be moderate. In a virtuous circle, this
cooperative behavior by the public makes the
central bank’s commitment to low inflation easier
to fulfill. In contrast, if the public is skeptical of
the central bank’s commitment to low inflation
(for example, if it believes that the central bank
may give in to the temptation to overstimulate the
economy for the sake of short-term employment
gains), then the public’s inflation expectations will
be higher than they otherwise would be. Expecta-
tions of high inflation lead to more aggressive
wage and price demands, which make achieving
and maintaining low inflation more difficult and
costly (in terms of lost output and employment)
for the central bank.
Providing a clear explanation of why credi-
bility is important for effective policymaking, as
Kydland and Prescott did, was an important step.
However, these authors largely left open the critical
issue of how a central bank is supposed to obtain
credibility in the first place. Here is where Rogoff’s
seminal article took up the thread.4 Motivated by
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1 Rogoff’s paper was widely circulated in 1982, a sad commentary
on publication lags in economics.
2 In focusing on three landmark papers, I necessarily ignore what has
become an enormous literature on credibility and monetary policy.
Walsh (2003, Chap. 8) provides an excellent overview. Rogoff (1987)
was an important early survey of the “first generation” of models
of credibility in the context of central banking.
3 In another noteworthy paper, Calvo (1978) made a number of
points similar to those developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
The extension of the Kydland-Prescott “inflation bias” by Barro
and Gordon (1983a) has proved highly influential.
4 Rogoff was my graduate school classmate at M.I.T., and I recently
asked him for his recollections about the origins of the “conservative”
central banker. Here (from a personal e-mail) is part of his response: 
[T]he paper was mainly written at the Board in 1982…It
came out as an IMF working paper in February 1983 (I was
visiting there), and then the same version came out as an
International Finance Discussion paper [at the Board of
Governors] in September 1983…The original version of the
paper…featured inflation targeting. Much like the published
paper, I suggested that having an independent central bank
can be a solution to the time consistency [that is, credibility]
problem if we give the bank an intermediate target and some
(unspecified) incentive to hit the target…I had the conserva-
tive central banker idea in there as well, as one practical way
to ensure the central bank placed a high weight on inflation.
Larry Summers, my editor at the [Quarterly Journal of
Economics], urged me to move that idea up to the front 
 the example of Carter and Volcker, Rogoff’s paper
showed analytically why even a President who
is not particularly averse to inflation, or at least
no more so than the average member of the general
public, might find it in his interest to appoint a
well-known “inflation hawk” to head the central
bank. The benefit of appointing a hawkish central
banker is the increased inflation-fighting credibil-
ity that such an appointment brings. The public is
certainly more likely to believe an inflation hawk
when he promises to contain inflation because
they understand that, as someone who is intrinsi-
cally averse to inflation, he is unlikely to renege
on his commitment. As increased credibility
allows the central bank to achieve low inflation
at a smaller cost than a noncredible central bank
can, the President may well find, somewhat para-
doxically, that he prefers the economic outcomes
achieved under the hawkish central banker to
those that could have been obtained under a
central banker with views closer to his own and
those of the public.
Appointing an inflation hawk to head the
central bank may not be enough to ensure credi-
bility for monetary policy, however. As Rogoff
noted in his article, for this strategy to confer sig-
nificant credibility benefits, the central bank must
be perceived by the public as being sufficiently
independent from the rest of the government to
be immune to short-term political pressures. Thus
Rogoff’s proposed strategy was really two-pronged:
The appointment of inflation-averse central
bankers must be combined with measures to
ensure central bank independence. These ideas,
supported by a great deal of empirical work, have
proven highly influential.5 Indeed, the credibility
benefits of central bank autonomy have been
widely recognized in the past 20 years, not only
in the academic literature but, far more consequen-
tially, in the real-world design of central banking
institutions. For example, in the United Kingdom,
the euro area, Japan, and numerous other places,
recent legislation or other government action has
palpably strengthened the independence of the
central banks.6
Rogoff’s proposed solution to the credibility
problems of central banks does have some limi-
tations, however, as Ken recognized both in his
paper and in subsequent work. First, although
an inflation-averse central banker enhances credi-
bility and delivers lower inflation on average, he
may not respond to shocks to the economy in the
socially desirable way. For example, faced with
an aggregate supply shock (such as a sharp rise
in oil prices), an inflation-averse central banker
will tend to react too aggressively (from society’s
point of view) to contain the inflationary impact
of the shock, with insufficient attention to the
consequences of his policy for output and employ-
ment.7 Second, contrary to an assumption of
Rogoff’s paper, in practice, the policy preferences
of a newly appointed central banker will not be
precisely known by the public but must be inferred
from policy actions. (Certainly the public’s per-
ceptions of Chairman Volcker’s views and objec-
tives evolved over time.) Knowing that the public
must make such inferences might tempt a central
banker to misrepresent the state of the economy
(Canzoneri, 1985) or even to take suboptimal
policy decisions; for example, the central banker
may feel compelled to tighten policy more aggres-
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section and place inflation targeting second. This, of course,
is how the paper ended up.
[Regarding the Fed], Dale Henderson and Matt Canzoneri
liked the paper very much…[M]any other researchers gave
me feedback on my paper (including Peter Tinsley, Ed
Offenbacher, Bob Flood, Jo Anna Gray, and many others)…
Last but perhaps most important, there is absolutely no doubt
that the paper was inspired by my experience watching the
Volcker Fed at close range. I never would have written it had
I not…ended up as an economist at the Board.
5 Walsh (2003, Section 8.5) reviews empirical research on the corre-
lations of central bank independence and economic outcomes. A
consistent finding is that more-independent central banks produce
lower inflation without any increase in output volatility.
6 The benefits of central bank independence should not lead us to
ignore its downside, which is that the very distance from the politi-
cal process that increases the central bank’s policy credibility by
necessity also risks isolating the central bank and making it less
democratically accountable. For this reason, central bankers should
make communication with the public and their elected represen-
tatives a high priority. Moreover, central bank independence does
not imply that central banks should never coordinate with other
parts of the government, under the appropriate circumstances.
7 Lohmann (1992) shows that this problem can be ameliorated if the
government limits the central bank’s independence, stepping in
to override the central bank’s decisions when the supply shock
becomes too large. However, to preserve the central bank’s inde-
pendence in normal situations, this approach would involve stating
clearly in advance the conditions under which the government
would intercede, which may not be practicable.
 sively than is warranted in order to convince the
public of his determination to fight inflation. The
public’s need to infer the central banker’s policy
preferences may even generate increased econ-
omic instability, as has been shown in a lively
recent literature on the macroeconomic conse-
quences of learning.8
The third pathbreaking paper I will mention
today, a 1995 article by Carl Walsh entitled
“Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers,” was an
attempt to address both of these issues.9 To do
so, Walsh conducted a thought experiment. He
asked his readers to imagine that the government
or society could offer the head of the central bank
a performance contract, one that includes explicit
monetary rewards or penalties that depend on the
economic outcomes that occur under his watch.
Remarkably, Walsh showed that, in principle, a
relatively simple contract between the government
and the central bank would lead to the implemen-
tation of monetary policies that would be both
credible and fully optimal. Under this contract,
the government provides the central banker with
a base level of compensation but then applies a
penalty that depends on the realized rate of
inflation—the higher the observed inflation rate,
the greater the penalty.
If the public understands the nature of the
contract and if the penalty assessed for permitting
inflation is large enough to affect central bank
behavior, the existence of the contract would give
credence to central bank promises to keep the
inflation rate low (that is, the contract would
provide credibility).10 Walsh’s contract has in
common with Rogoff’s approach the idea that, in
a world of imperfect credibility, giving the central
banker an objective function that differs from the
true objectives of society may be useful. However,
Walsh also shows that the contracting approach
ameliorates the two problems associated with
Rogoff’s approach. First, under the Walsh con-
tract, the central banker has incentives not only
to achieve the target rate of inflation but also to
respond in the socially optimal manner to supply
shocks.11 Second, as the inflation objective and
the central banker’s incentive scheme are made
explicit by the contract, the public’s problem of
inferring the central banker’s policy preferences
is significantly reduced.
There have been a few attempts in the real
world to implement an incentive contract for
central bankers—most famously a plan proposed
to the New Zealand legislature, though never
adopted, which provided for firing the governor
of the central bank if the inflation rate deviated
too far from the government’s inflation objective.12
But Walsh’s contracts are best treated as a metaphor
rather than as a literal proposal for central bank
reform. Although the pay of central bankers is
unlikely ever to depend directly on the realized
rate of inflation, central bankers, like most people,
care about many other aspects of their jobs, includ-
ing their professional reputations, the prestige of
the institutions in which they serve, and the
probability that they will be reappointed.
Walsh’s analysis and many subsequent refine-
ments by other authors suggest that central bank
performance might be improved if the government
set explicit performance standards for the central
bank (perhaps as part of the institution’s charter
or enabling legislation) and regularly compared
objectives and outcomes. Alternatively, because
central banks may possess the greater expertise
in determining what economic outcomes are both
feasible and most desirable, macroeconomic goals
might be set through a joint exercise of the govern-
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8 Evans and Honkopohja (2001) is the standard reference on learning
in macroeconomics. Recent papers that apply models of learning
to the analysis of U.S. monetary policy include Erceg and Levin
(2001) and Orphanides and Williams (forthcoming).
9 Persson and Tabellini (1993) provided an influential analysis of
the contracting approach that extended and developed many of
the points made by Walsh (1995).
10 An objection to this conclusion is that, although the central bank’s
incentives are made clear by the contract, the public might worry
that the government might renege on its commitment to low infla-
tion by changing the contract. Those who discount this concern
argue that changing the contract in midstream would be costly for
the government, because laws once enacted are difficult to modify
and because changing an established framework for policy in an
opportunistic way would be politically embarrassing.
11 A key assumption underlying this result is that the central banker
cares about the state of the economy as well as about the income
provided by his incentive contract.
12 In personal communications, Walsh reports to me that he was
visiting a research institute in New Zealand at the time of these
discussions. Walsh’s reflection on the New Zealand proposals
helped to inspire his paper.
 ment and the central bank. Many countries have
established targets for inflation, for example, and
central bankers in those countries evidently make
strong efforts to attain those targets. The Federal
Reserve Act does not set quantitative goals for the
U.S. central bank, but it does specify the objec-
tives of price stability and maximum sustainable
employment and requires the central bank to
present semiannual reports to the Congress on
monetary policy and the state of the economy.
Accountability to the public as well as to the legis-
lature is also important; for this reason, the central
bank should explain regularly what it is trying to
achieve and why. In sum, Walsh’s paper can be
read as providing theoretical support for an
explicit, well-designed, and transparent frame-
work for monetary policy, one which sets forth
the objectives of policy and holds central bankers
accountable for reaching those objectives (or at
least for providing a detailed and plausible expla-
nation of why the objectives were missed).
In the simple model that Walsh analyzes,
the optimal contract provides all the incentives
needed to induce the best possible monetary
policy, so that appointing a hawkish central
banker is no longer beneficial. However, in prac-
tice—because Walsh’s optimal contracts can be
roughly approximated at best, because both the
incentives and the policy decisions faced by
central bankers are far more complex than can
be captured by simple models, and because the
appointment of an inflation-averse central banker
may provide additional assurance to the public
that the government and the central bank will
keep their promises—the Walsh approach and
the Rogoff approach are almost certainly comple-
mentary.13 That is, a clear, well-articulated mone-
tary policy framework, inflation-averse central
bankers, and autonomy for central banks in the
execution of policy are all likely to contribute to
increased central bank credibility and hence better
policy outcomes. Of course, other factors that I
could not cover in this short review, such as the
central bank’s reputation for veracity as established
over time, may also strengthen its credibility
(Barro and Gordon, 1983b; Backus and Driffill,
1985).14
Let me end where I began, with reference to
Paul Volcker and his contributions. I have dis-
cussed today how Volcker’s personality and per-
formance inspired one seminal piece of research
about the determinants of central bank credibility.
In focusing on a few pieces of academic research,
however, I have greatly understated the impact
of the Volcker era on views about central banking.
The Volcker disinflation (and analogous episodes
in the United Kingdom, Canada, and elsewhere)
was undoubtedly a major catalyst for an explosion
of fresh thinking by economists and policymakers
about central bank credibility, how it is obtained,
and its benefits for monetary policymaking. Over
the past two decades, this new thinking has con-
tributed to a wave of changes in central banking,
particularly with respect to the institutional design
of central banks and the establishment of new
frameworks for the making of monetary policy.
Ironically, the applicability of the ideas stimu-
lated by the Volcker chairmanship to the experi-
ence of the U.S. economy under his stewardship
remains unclear. Though the appointment of
Volcker undoubtedly increased the credibility of
the Federal Reserve, the Volcker disinflation was
far from a costless affair, being associated with a
minor recession in 1980 and a deep recession in
1981-82.15 Evidently, Volcker’s personal credibil-
ity notwithstanding, Americans’ memories of the
inflationary 1970s were too fresh for their inflation
expectations to change quickly. It is difficult to
know whether alternative tactics would have
helped; for example, the announcement of explicit
inflation objectives (which would certainly have
been a radical idea at the time) might have helped
guide inflation expectations downward more
quickly, but they might also have created a political
backlash that would have doomed the entire effort.
Perhaps no policy approach or set of institutional
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13 Several authors have shown this point in models in which the
inflation bias arising from noncredible policies differs across
states of nature; see, for example, Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997)
and Svensson (1997).
14 But see Rogoff (1987) for a critique of models of central bank 
reputation.
15 Evidence on the behavior of inflation expectations after 1979 sup-
ports the view that the public came to appreciate only very gradually
that Volcker’s policies represented a break from the immediate
past (Erceg and Levin, 2001).
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arrangements could have eliminated the 1970s
inflation at a lower cost than was actually incurred.
If so, then the significance of Paul Volcker’s
appointment was not its immediate effect on
expectations or credibility but rather that he was
one of the rare individuals tough enough and
with sufficient foresight to do what had to be
done. By doing what was necessary to achieve
price stability, the Volcker Fed laid the ground-
work for two decades, so far, of strong economic
performance.
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y good friend Ben Bernanke is always
a hard act to follow. When I drafted
these remarks, I was concerned that
Ben would take all the best points and cover
them extremely well, leaving only some crumbs
for Ben McCallum and me to pick up. But his
decision to concentrate on one issue—central
bank credibility—leaves me plenty to talk about.
Because Ben was so young in 1979, I’d like
to begin by emphasizing that Paul Volcker retaught
the world something it seemed to have forgotten
at the time: that tight monetary policy can bring
inflation down at substantial, but not devastating,
cost. It seems strange to harbor contrary thoughts
today, but back then many people believed that
10 percent inflation was so deeply ingrained in
the U.S. economy that we might be doomed to,
say, 6 to 10 percent inflation for a very long time.
For example, Otto Eckstein (1981, pp. 3-4) wrote
in a well-known 1981 book that “To bring the core
inflation rate down significantly through fiscal
and monetary policies alone would require a pro-
longed deep recession bordering on depression,
with the average unemployment rate held above
10%.” More concretely, he estimated that it would
require 10 point-years of unemployment to bring
the core inflation rate down a single percentage
point,1 which is about five times more than called
for by the “Brookings rule of thumb.”2 As it
turned out, the Volcker disinflation followed the
Brookings rule of thumb rather well. About 14
cumulative percentage point–years of unemploy-
ment above the nonaccelerating inflation rate of
unemployment (NAIRU) drove core inflation
down by 6.2 percentage points over the six years
spanning 1980 to 1985.3 Yes, disinflation hurt, but
much less than what the pessimists envisioned.
Volcker may have enhanced the Fed’s credibility;
I certainly think so. But that did not improve the
inflation-unemployment trade-off.
The forced march of core inflation down
from 10 percent to 4 percent in the early 1980s
taught us a second lesson that, I believe, is the
essence of Paul Volcker’s legacy: that sometimes
the central bank has to be single-minded about
fighting inflation, and that the strong will of a
determined leader like Volcker is one key ingre-
dient. When Volcker took the helm, the nation’s
problem was clear—too much inflation—and so
was the solution—sustained tight money. It only
required someone with iron will to apply the solu-
tion to the problem. Lindsey, Orphanides, and
Rasche (2005) ask at this conference whether
Volcker was a monetarist, a Keynesian, an infla-
tion targeter, and so on. They seem to answer no
in each case. To me, the right short characteriza-
tion of Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Fed is sim-
ple: He was a highly principled and determined
inflation hawk. 
I would like to contrast these two Volcker
lessons, which are the foci of this conference, with
two quite different lessons that we can take away
from the Greenspan era. The first is that, in appar-
ent contradiction to what I just said, flexibility in
monetary policy is very important. The contradic-
tion is only apparent, not actual, because the
worlds faced by Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan
were starkly different. During the Greenspan years,
inflation has flared up only once, in 1990-91, and
then only briefly. Instead, Greenspan has faced,
among other things, two severe stock market
crashes, a period of fragile bank balance sheets in
the early 1990s, the rolling international financial
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1 Eckstein (1981, p. 46).
2 This rule of thumb was due to a number of members of the
Brookings Panel on Economic Activity in the 1970s, including
Arthur Okun, George Perry, and William Nordhaus, but especially
arose from a series of papers by Robert Gordon.
3 The calculation assumes a NAIRU of 5.8 percent, which was the
actual unemployment rate of 1979.
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 crises of 1997 and 1998,4 the surprising produc-
tivity acceleration after 1995, a brief flirtation with
deflation, and the need to pull off several “soft
landings.” Excruciatingly tight money was not
the right solution to any of these problems. I dare-
say that history will not remember Alan Greenspan
as the man who took 17 years to bring inflation
down from 4 percent to 2 percent. Rather, it will
remember him as the Fed Chairman who dealt
so well with a remarkable variety of difficult
challenges over a prolonged period of time.
Here’s a test. Try a little mental free-association
with the phrase “accomplishments of Paul Volcker
as Chairman of the Fed.”5 I think all of you will
immediately think of “conquering inflation,” or
something synonymous with that. Now try
“accomplishments of Alan Greenspan as Chairman
of the Fed.” Here there are so many choices that
I doubt that even this well-informed group could
ever agree on a single answer. My own choice
would be how spectacularly well he recognized
and dealt with the productivity acceleration after
1995. But others will have their own favorite on
the long and impressive Greenspan hit parade.
That hit parade brings me naturally to the
fourth lesson, which is that fine tuning is actually
possible if you combine enough skill with a mo-
dicum of good luck. I began my economic educa-
tion in the halcyon days of Walter Heller, when
a number of economists really believed in fine-
tuning. By the time I started teaching at Princeton
in 1971, however, this belief had been shattered.
But Alan Greenspan’s remarkable performance
should bring it roaring back. Greenspan probably
shuns the label “fine-tuner.” But his record is
replete with delicate decisions over moves of 0
versus 25 basis points or 25 versus 50 basis points,
with careful management of the exact monthly
timing of this rate increase or that rate decrease,
with several actual and attempted soft landings,
with influencing markets with minor variations
in wording, and so on. If that is not fine-tuning,
I don’t know what is. And you know what? It
worked. We’ve had only two mild recessions
during Greenspan’s long watch. As a result, the
bar for the next Chairman of the Fed has been set
extraordinarily high.
My fifth lesson goes back to the Volcker years.
Curiously, it seems not to have been mentioned
at this conference yet. So let me say it: Money-
supply targeting can be hazardous to a nation’s
health. Lindsey, Orphanides, and Rasche (2005)
have discussed whether or not we should view
the money-growth rule as a “political heat shield”
that Volcker selected opportunistically to fend off
criticisms of excruciatingly tight money. Frankly,
after reading their paper I’m not sure whether
their answer is yes or no. (My own view is yes.)
But regardless, two things seem clear—and I
state them here, at the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, of all places. First, the Fed overdid
monetary stringency in 1980-81 partly because
of the misbehavior of velocity.6 And second, res-
cuing the economy in 1982 required abandoning
the experiment with monetarism. I shudder to
think what might have happened to the U.S.
economy in 1982 and thereafter if the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) had stubbornly
stuck to its money growth targets. But Volcker and
his colleagues were too smart—and insufficiently
doctrinaire—to do that. (By the way, that’s a good
combination of attributes for a central banker.)
If a central bank abandons monetary aggre-
gates, what should it put in their place? Many
experts now answer: inflation targets. But that
just pushes the question back one stage to this:
What instrument should the central bank use to
pursue its inflation target? After all, no matter how
much theoretical models try to pretend that it is,
the inflation rate is not a control variable. Milton
Friedman taught us years ago that the nominal
interest rate is a bad choice; fixing it can even lead
to dynamic instability. The real interest rate, we
have learned in the Volcker and Greenspan years,
is a far better choice. And that is my sixth lesson.
Greenspan, in particular, has focused atten-
tion on an update of Wicksell’s “natural interest
rate” concept that we now call the neutral real
federal funds rate. And, more by his actions than
6 Specifically, I do not believe the Fed ever intended to cause a
recession as deep as the one we had.
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4 Analogously to these last two, Volcker had to devote a great deal
of time and energy to debt crisis in the developing countries that
erupted in 1982 and the consequent concentration of risks on the
balance sheets of many money center banks.
5 The last five words are important. I am in awe of Volcker’s many
accomplishments since leaving the Federal Reserve System.
 by his rhetoric, he has called attention to the
Taylor rule as a useful benchmark. For current
purposes, I write the Taylor rule as a guide for set-
ting the nominal funds rate in a way that stabilizes
both inflation and output:
,
where i is the nominal funds rate, r* is the neutral
level of the real funds rate, π is the inflation rate,
y is the (log) of output, and π* and y* are the tar-
gets for inflation and output, respectively. We
think of monetary policy as “easy” when i < r* + π
and as “tight” when i > r* + π.
I view the Taylor rule as a useful way of think-
ing about monetary policy, although it is not, and
John Taylor did not intend it to be, a literal rule in
the Friedmanite sense. Several aspects of the
Taylor rule are worth mentioning. The first is that
both α and β are positive. This means, for example,
that there may be times when it is appropriate for
the central bank to hold its interest rate below neu-
tral even though the inflation rate is above target.7
The second aspect constitutes my seventh
lesson. The requirement that α be positive means
that the central bank should react more than
point for point to changes in the inflation rate.
For example, under Taylor’s choice of α = 1/2,
each 1-point move in the inflation rate would
induce the central bank to adjust its policy rate
by 150 basis points in the same direction, meaning
that the real funds rate moves by 50 basis points
in that direction. If α is not positive, the central
bank would be allowing rising inflation to reduce
the real federal funds rate—a potentially destabi-
lizing policy.
My last few lessons were learned in the
Greenspan era. The eighth lesson is hardly ever
mentioned, but I think it should be. Three times
during the Greenspan era, the Fed demonstrated
that doing nothing can constitute a remarkably
effective, even bold, monetary policy.
The first such episode started in July or
September 1992 and lasted until February 1994.8
To stimulate an economy that seemed to be fight-
ir yy = ++ − ( )+ ( ) ** – * πα ππ β
ing substantial financial “headwinds,” the Fed
held the nominal funds rate at 3 percent, which
at the time meant that the real funds rate was kept
at around zero, for about 18 months. This sizable
and long-lasting monetary stimulus helped get
the economy rolling in 1994 and thereafter. The
third such episode was a similar effort to stimulate
a sluggish economy. The Fed lowered the nominal
funds rate to 1.25 percent in November 2002 and
then to 1 percent in June 2003—and then held it
there until June 30, 2004, a period of 12 to 19
months, depending on when you want to start
counting. In both of these cases, the degree of
monetary stimulus was quite large and the length
of time for which it was applied was very long, by
the standards of central banking. In that sense,
each of these periods of “doing nothing” consti-
tuted a boldly expansionary policy.9
The middle episode of “doing nothing” was
a bit different from the other two but, if anything,
was an even bolder departure from standard cen-
tral banking practice. From January 1996 until
June 1999, the Fed did not raise interest rates to
restrain the booming economy even though the
unemployment rate kept falling through any rea-
sonable estimate of the NAIRU.10 Janet Yellen
and I (2001) have called this episode the years of
“forbearance,” and it constituted a real gamble
that Greenspan took over the objections of a num-
ber of FOMC members.11 Other than his oft-
expressed skepticism about the NAIRU concept,
the stated basis for Greenspan’s refusal to raise
rates was his belief—which was subsequently
ratified by the data—that productivity had accel-
erated and would continue on a high trajectory,
thereby justifying a faster trend growth rate.12
The gamble paid off handsomely.
9 During much of the more recent episode, the inflation rate was
drifting down, so the real funds rate was actually rising slightly.
In the 1992-94 episode, inflation was quite constant.
10 There was actually one 25-basis-point rate hike in March 1997. But
the FOMC also reduced the funds rate by 75 basis points following
the financial crisis in the fall of 1998.
11 For more details on this episode from an insider’s perspective,
see Meyer (2004).
12 Higher productivity growth, by itself, does not lead to an ever-
decreasing NAIRU. But favorable supply shocks and the related
hypothesis that actual productivity was running ahead faster than
productivity as perceived by workers will lead to a transitory decline
in NAIRU. On the latter, see Blinder and Yellen (2001, Chap. 6).
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7 Conversely, if y is high enough, the central bank will want “tight
money,” even if inflation is already below target.
8 The Fed cut the funds rate to 3.25 percent in July 1992 and to 3
percent in September 1992.
 All three of these episodes, but especially the
last, lead naturally to my ninth lesson. Another
significant part of the Greenspan legacy is the
demonstration that a central bank can be strongly
pro-growth without being irresponsible. This, I
think, is a genuine benefit of the Federal Reserve’s
much-maligned dual mandate to support both low
inflation and high employment, coupled with a
Chairman willing to make use of it. It would, I
believe, have been much more difficult for an
inflation-targeting central bank, or for a bank like
the European Central Bank with a mono-goal, to
forbear in 1996-99 the way the Fed did.
During these three periods of FOMC 
“inaction,” intermediate and long rates were not
marking time. Similarly, during the most recent
Federal Reserve tightening (June 1999–May 2000)
and easing (January 2001–June 2004) cycles, bond
rates moved around quite a bit—generally in the
direction the Fed wanted. This leads to the tenth
lesson learned since 1979: If the central bank lets
the markets in on its thinking, the markets can
do part of the work of monetary policy. Specifi-
cally, if the markets believe the central bank will
soon be raising (lowering) rates, intermediate and
long rates will rise (fall) in anticipation, thereby
tightening (easing) “monetary policy” before the
policymakers lift a finger.
Outsourcing part of the work to the bond
market in this way has two interesting, and prob-
ably salutary, implications for monetary policy.
First, and less important, the central bank should
not have to move its policy rate around as much,
in either direction, as would be necessary without
the anticipatory behavior of the bond market.
Second, and more important, the lags in monetary
policy should be reduced by the bond market’s
reactions. Not so many years ago, central bankers
and economists viewed long rates as following
short rates with a substantial lag—which slowed
down the transmission of monetary policy
impulses into the real economy. Nowadays, many
central bankers and economists see long rates as
leading short rates.
This anticipatory process can work, however,
only if the central bank communicates its inten-
tions to the markets effectively. Thus, and this is
my final lesson from post-1979 experience,
greater transparency can enhance the effective-
ness of monetary policy. The old tradition at
central banks was, of course, to say little and to
say it cryptically. That’s how the temple kept
secrets. There is still far too much secrecy for my
taste. But the unmistakable trend, both at the
Fed and around the world, is toward greater
transparency.
I could go on and on about why I think this
is a salutary trend, both for democracy and for
monetary policy—and I have.13 But I think it is
now time to relinquish the platform to Ben
McCallum. Suffice it to say that while the Federal
Reserve has often hesitated over specific incre-
mental increases in disclosure, and while it has
sometimes warned of adverse consequences from
greater transparency, virtually none of these
adverse consequences have ever come to pass,
and the Fed has never regretted its step-by-step
movements toward greater openness.14 At least
that’s my reading of the history since 1994. If
they disagree, there are plenty of current and for-
mer Federal Reserve officials present here today
to dispute what I have just said.
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he question posed for this panel cannot
be answered entirely straightforwardly,
for different analysts knew (i.e., believed)
different things about monetary policy in October
1979, and the same is true now. But I will try to
speak to the spirit of the question in an opera-
tional way by briefly contrasting mainstream
models that are being used now, for policy analy-
sis, with ones that were being used then. For the
“now” portion of this comparison it is easy to
write down a prototypical model, which is basi-
cally the one labeled as the “consensus” model
by Goodfriend (2005) in his contribution to this
conference. One might quibble with the term con-
sensus, since some economists do not approve
of this model, but it is in fact a very standard
starting point, among policy analysts, for elabo-
ration or in some cases disagreement. So, the
agenda now is to compare it to its counterpart
of 1979. How might one select a 1979-vintage
model for that purpose? Well, in October of 1979,
I was in the midst of writing a paper (McCallum,
1980) that was designed to demonstrate the
effects of incorporating rational expectations (RE)
into an otherwise mainstream macro model.
Using that paper’s model to represent those typi-
cal in 1979 might not be a perfect solution, but
it is probably as good as anyone could reasonably
expect. 
Consider, then, the following basic model,
circa 1979:
(1) yt = b0 + b1(Rt – Et∆pt+1) + vt b1 < 0
(2) ∆pt = Et –1∆pt + α1(yt – y –
t) 
+ α2(yt–1 – y –
t–1) + ut α1 > 0, α2 < 0
(3) mt + µ0 + µ1mt–1
+ µ2(yt – y –
t–1) = et µ1 > 0, µ2 < 0
(4) mt – pt = c0 + c1yt + c2Rt + ηt c1 > 0, c2 < 0
(5) y –
t = γ0 + γ1y –
t–1 + at γ1 > 0
Here the symbols are as follows: yt = log of output,
y –
t = log of natural-rate output, pt = log of price
level, mt = log of money stock, Rt = one-period
interest rate, and vt, ut, et, ηt, at = stochastic shocks.
Equation (1) represents an IS function in which
the rate of spending on goods and services is taken
to depend (negatively) on the real rate of interest.
Equation (2) is a “natural rate” type of Phillips
curve or price adjustment relationship, with the
unit coefficient on Et –1∆pt implying the absence
of any long-run trade-off, as in Fischer (1977) or
Lucas (1973). In addition, (4) is a money demand
(or “LM”) function of a standard type, while (3)
represents monetary policy behavior with the
central bank adjusting the money supply1 each
period in a way that responds to the current (or
possibly a recent past) output gap. The latter con-
cept refers to the fractional difference between
output and its natural rate value, with the latter
being generated (exogenously, for simplicity) in
equation (5). 
Using models of basically the foregoing speci-
fication, researchers such as Lucas (1973), Fischer
(1977), Sargent (1973), Taylor (1979), and
McCallum (1980) conducted RE analysis to deter-
mine the dynamic properties of various systems
and alternative policy rules. One of the main
objects of analysis was to determine whether the
systematic components of monetary policy rules,
or only the purely random components, have
effects on the cyclical properties of real variables—
including employment and especially the output
gap—when expectations are formed rationally.
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fications that would be represented by (3) in the model.
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 Lucas (1972, 1973), Sargent (1973), and most
notably Sargent and Wallace (1975) argued that
the behavior of the gap would be unaffected by
alternative monetary policy rules, while Fischer
(1977) and Taylor (1979) took the opposing posi-
tion. My review (McCallum, 1980) concluded that
there were plausible specifications that would
support each position. It should be emphasized,
however, that most policy analysis being con-
ducted at the time was not of this type, focusing
on properties of dynamic systems, but instead
featured point-in-time exercises of the type that
RE analysis showed to be (in many cases) funda-
mentally misleading. 
For comparison, today’s prototype model can
be written, in its simplest form, as follows:
(6) yt = b0 + b1(Rt – Et∆pt+1) + Etyt+1 + vt b1 < 0
(7) ∆pt = βEt∆pt+1 + α1(yt – y –
t) + ut α1 > 0
(8) Rt = µ0 + ∆pt + µ1(∆pt – π*)
+ µ2(yt – y –
t–1) + et µ1 > 0, µ2 > 0
(9) mt – pt = c0 + c1yt + c2Rt + ηt c1 > 0, c2 < 0
(10) y –
t = γ0 + γ1y –
t–1 + at γ1 > 0
Here, there are three major changes from the
model of 1979. First, the term Etyt+1 enters the
counterpart of the IS function (1), reflecting that
equation’s origin as a consumption Euler equation,
with consumption substituted out in favor of out-
put, to represent optimizing behavior by rational
optimizing households.2 Second, the usual
Phillips or price adjustment relation (7) differs
from (2) by having βEt∆pt+1 instead of Et–1∆pt as
the reference expected inflation rate. Again, this
specification is more readily justified by optimiz-
ing analysis, due in this version to Calvo (1983)
and a host of follow-up papers, including King
and Wolman (1996). Finally, the most striking
change is in the monetary policy rule (8), which
is here expressed in terms of the one-period nomi-
nal interest rate, used as an instrument variable,
instead of the growth rate of the (base) money
supply. This change in the usual modeling prac-
tice, which was given an important impetus by
Taylor (1993), undoubtedly represents a move in
the direction of realism since actual central banks
of industrial countries almost invariably use some
short-term nominal interest rate as their “operat-
ing target.” Whether that mode of policy behavior
is socially desirable is not an entirely settled
matter, although the preponderance of opinion
has certainly moved in that direction, partly under
the forceful influence of Woodford (1999, 2003). 
Of course, today’s models often do not include
any money demand relation such as (9). Given the
absence of monetary aggregate variables from (6)
and (7), this omission becomes formally innocu-
ous when policy is conducted as in (8), as has been
explained numerous times (e.g., McCallum, 1999).
Today’s models do not imply that no such money
demand relation obtains, of course, but merely
that their specification does not influence the
dynamic behavior of the main macro variables
given the remainder of the (recursive) system. 
There are two other ways, besides this change
in the monetary policy instrument, in which
today’s policy analysis usually differs from that
of 1979. The first has already been mentioned; it
is that today the standard mode of policy analysis
involves a comparison of the behavior of target
variables (e.g., inflation and the output gap) under
different maintained policy rules, rather than
point-in-time exercises.3 The other is that today’s
models are constructed in a manner that attempts
to respect both theory and evidence, by using
optimization-based general equilibrium analysis
in an attempt to develop systems that are poten-
tially structural—and thus immune to the Lucas
critique (Lucas, 1976)—and by specifying the
models quantitatively, either as a result of econo-
metric estimation or by selection of their parameter
values on the basis of a careful calibration (of
the type emphasized in the real business cycle
literature).
3 I would definitely include the design of optimal policy rules under
the former heading, despite various reservations mentioned in
McCallum and Nelson (2004).
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2 This simplest version of the model does not include endogenous
investment spending, as distinct from consumption. Endogenous
investment can be included fairly readily, but some users instead
calibrate the sensitivity of spending to the real interest rate so as
to match the consumption-plus-investment value, rather than the
one appropriate to consumption alone.
 PROMINENT TOPICS
A second way to approach the question “What
have we learned?” would be to consider specific
topics that have been prominent—of major pro-
fessional interest—among monetary economists
since October 1979. A list of such topics that I
have put together fairly quickly includes those





iv. Commitment versus discretionary 
policy optimization
v. Central bank independence
vi. Vector autoregression (VAR) models
vii. Real business cycle models
viii. New Keynesian models
ix. Structural VAR models
x. New neoclassical synthesis models
xi. Transparency and communication
xii. Interest rate smoothing
xiii. Taylor rules
xiv. Inflation targeting
xv. Analysis with real-time data 
xvi. The zero lower bound on nominal 
interest rates
xvii. Optimality from a “timeless 
perspective”
xviii. Targeting versus instrument rules
xix. Indeterminacy, learnability, and 
E-stability
Most of these topics are of considerable intel-
lectual content and interest; indeed, I have been
interested in a majority of them myself. But, in
trying to answer “What have we learned?” it
would seem best to strive for a shorter and more
practically oriented list, in part because merely
to specify the meaning of each of the terms and
provide a citation of the key references would
require several pages. In the next and final section,
accordingly, I will try to produce one.
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 
A SHORT LIST
First, we have learned to conduct monetary
policy analysis in a manner that seems reasonable
to both academic and central bank economists.
This is important because it facilitates commu-
nication between these two groups of analysts. I
have argued (McCallum, 1999) that this conver-
gence of viewpoints has proceeded to the point
where one usually cannot tell from examination
of a particular research paper whether it was writ-
ten by an academic or a central bank economist.
For this healthy development I would give much
credit to the simple but insightful exposition of
Taylor (1993). It is, of course, possible to worry
about how much of today’s highly technical
research actually influences policymakers, such
as members of the FOMC. But there are positive
indications, both at the Board of Governors and
at regional Federal Reserve Banks. Not only in
the Fed, but also in the central banks of other
countries (e.g., the Bank of England, the European
Central Bank, the Bank of Japan), it has become
fairly common for the top monetary policymaking
committee to include research economists among
its voting members. (Indeed, several are present
at this conference!)
Second, we have learned that the crucial
requirement for a central bank is to give top prior-
ity to the task of keeping inflation low. At least
this is the message that I perceive from all the
attention that has been paid to “inflation targeting.”
Terminologically, there is a bit of a problem with
respect to the formal literature on that subject,
for it is unclear why an optimizing central bank
with an objective function of the form 
(11) maximize 
λ $ 0
should be called an inflation targeter rather than
an “output gap targeter,” especially if λ is relatively
large. But in practice, each recognized inflation-
targeting central bank has emphasized achieve-
ment of a low inflation rate as its top priority.
So I think that it can be said that there is much
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several researchers (e.g., Orphanides, 2001, 2003;
McCallum, 2001) have argued that it would be
dangerous for the central bank to respond strongly
to an operational measure of the output gap, in
part because of the great difficulty that prevails
in practice in obtaining satisfactory estimates of
the natural-rate value, y –
t, or even in agreeing on
the proper concept to utilize for the latter. A
strong response to the level of the gap is not nec-
essarily the same as adopting a large value of λ
in (11), it should be noted. It is the same under dis-
cretionary optimization, but with the “timeless
perspective” approach the implied optimality
condition involves the change in the output gap,
in which case the undesirable effects of natural-
rate mismeasurement tend to cancel out to a sub-
stantial extent (Orphanides, 2003).4
Finally, I think that we have seen that it is
possible for central banks to avoid the inflation
bias that results from period-by-period discre-
tionary re-optimization when the target level of
output exceeds the natural-rate value. I hope that
this is because central banks are now avoiding
discretionary period-by-period re-optimization,
choosing instead to make policy in a committed,
rule-like fashion. Some form of timeless perspec-
tive behavior, that does not try to exploit condi-
tions that happen to prevail currently, is necessary
to avoid several types of suboptimality, including
the one mentioned above. But it remains some-
what unclear what the actual current situation is,
in terms of central bank behavior.
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